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It has been two decades since the world’s universal endorsement of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. What began primarily as an 
agreement directed at stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases at a safe level has 
since expanded its focus to recognize that some of the negative impacts of climate 
change are already being felt, especially in the developing world, and that developed 
countries have an obligation to provide concrete and significant adaptation support to 
developing countries. The past decade in particular has seen the creation of a number 
of initiatives on adaptation, key among them decisions in Bali in 2007 and Cancun in 
2010 that have placed adaptation at least formally at the same level of priority as 
mitigation.1 
 
How effective has the UNFCCC become at supporting adaptation in developing 
countries, and how could it do better? This is not an easy question to answer. 
Adaptation occurs locally in response to a wide variety of impacts, many of which are 
uncertain and future-oriented. It is more difficult to measure the effectiveness of an 
adaptation program than mitigation. With respect to mitigation, the UNFCCC has so 
far clearly failed to adequately reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions, leaving 
developing countries more vulnerable than ever.2 
 
The goal of this article is to explore climate change adaptation efforts in 
Bangladesh, to assess the effectiveness of the UNFCCC in assisting developing 
countries such as Bangladesh in their efforts to adapt, and to offer recommendations 
for negotiators of the future climate regime. Bangladesh was chosen as a case study 
because it is not only one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change, 
but it has also been one of the most active on adaptation, both within and outside of 
the UNFCCC. Because it has been so active, understanding the adaptation challenge 
in Bangladesh may offer insights into the potential role of the UNFCCC adaptation 
regime in addressing the adaptation needs of other developing countries.  
 
Of course, Bangladesh is only one of many developing countries, each with 
their own unique set of circumstances and adaptation needs.  Nevertheless, the article 
does serve to illustrate the extent to which the current approach under the UNFCCC is 
likely to serve Bangladesh well in its efforts to improve its adaptive capacity and its 
climate resilience.  The article draws some preliminary conclusions about the 
                                                
1  For more details, see UNFCCC, Adaptation Overview, online: UNFCCC 
<http://unfccc.int/adaptation/ items/7623.php>. 
2  See generally UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013: A UNEP Synthesis Report  (Nairobi: UNEP, 
 2013). 
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UNFCCC approach, while fully recognizing that such conclusions would have to be 
verified through similar case studies of many other developing countries.  It also 
means that the article’s recommendations focus on high level questions about the 
UNFCCC’s approach to adaptation, as more specific conclusions based on the 
Bangladesh case study would be less likely to be confirmed through similar case 
studies of other countries. 
 
The article is divided into the following sections. Section 1 provides an 
overview of adaptation efforts under the current UNFCCC regime.  Section 2 
summarizes the state of discussions with respect to the post-2020 approach to 
adaptation. Section 3 looks at adaptation on the ground in Bangladesh. Section 4 
offers recommendations for how the UNFCCC can improve its support for 
Bangladesh, followed by some concluding comments.  
 
 
1.  ADAPTATION UNDER THE UNFCCC  
 
The UNFCCC includes a surprising number of general obligations with respect 
to adaptation. While the focus at the time was clearly on mitigation, it is important to 
note the relatively strong language on adaptation in the Convention. Under Article 
4(1), all parties are to devise national and, where appropriate, regional adaptation 
programs, and to cooperate in preparing for adaptation to climate change.3 All parties 
commit to taking climate change considerations into account in their government 
policies (known as “mainstreaming”).4 Article 4(3) calls on developed country parties 
to provide new and additional funding to help developing country parties meet these 
obligations.5 Article 4(4) commits developed country parties to “assist the developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”.6 Article 4(8) expands 
further on the commitment to provide funding, insurance, and technology to meet the 
needs of developing countries, and especially those most vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change.7 Article 4(5) requires developed countries to “take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention”. Finally, Article 4(9) commits parties to take full account of the “specific 
needs and special situations” of least developed countries (LDCs) with regard to 
funding and technology.8 
 
The primary focus of the Kyoto Protocol is the mitigation of global greenhouse 
gas emissions, however, it also contains provisions to support adaptation in 
developing countries. Article 10(b) of the Protocol commits all parties to “formulate, 
implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to 
                                                
3  UNFCCC 1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, online: UNFCCC,  
<www.unfccc.int>, at art. 4(1) (hereinafter UNFCCC 1992). 
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid., at art. 4(3). 
6  Ibid., at art. 4(4). 
7  Ibid., at art. 4(8). 
8  Ibid., at art. 4(9). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2417944
 3 
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change”.9 Article 10(c) calls upon parties to 
take “all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the 
transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices 
and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, 
including the formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain 
and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and 
enhance the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies”.10 Article 
12(8) provides that a share of the proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) go towards assisting particularly vulnerable developing country parties meet 
the costs of adaptation.11 
 
There are two sub-themes that can be drawn from these provisions of the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol: the issue of financing of adaptation actions and 
issues related to accessing adaptation technology. In fact, all climate change 
adaptation efforts under the UNFCCC to date deal with finance and technology in 
some form (materials, equipment or knowledge).12 These two adaptation issues have 
evolved through decisions at key Conferences of the Parties. In 2000, at COP 6 in 
Bonn, the Adaptation Fund was created to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programs in developing countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol.13 Funding for 
the Adaptation Fund comes primarily from a 2 percent levy on the sale of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) derived from the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Additional funding comes from voluntary donations, and, as decided at COP 18 in 
2012, the extension of the 2 percent levy to Joint Implementation (JI) projects and 
international emissions trading (ET).14 
 
In 2001, at COP 7 in Marrakesh, parties established the LDC Work 
Programme.15 This programme reflects the special situation of LDCs acknowledged 
under Article 4(9) of the Convention.16 It supports capacity building in LDCs, 
including the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programmes of 
action (NAPAs).17 The purpose of NAPAs is to have LDCs “identify priority 
activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs with regard to climate 
                                                
9  UNFCCC, 1998, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
online: UNFCCC, at art. 10(b) <www.unfccc.int> (hereinafter UNFCCC 1998). 
10   Ibid., at art. 10(c).  
11   Ibid., at art. 12(8). 
12  See generally UNFCCC, Technologies for Adaptation to Climate Change (Bonn, Germany: Climate 
Change Secretariat (UNFCCC), 2006) (hereinafter UNFCCC, Technologies for Adaptation). 
13  Report of the Conference of the Parties on the First Part of its Sixth Session, Held at The Hague 
from 13 to 25 November 2000: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at the First Part of its Sixth Session, FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2, (1/CP.6, UNFCCC, 2001), at 
5. 
14  Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
on its Eighth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012: Addendum: Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol at its Eighth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, (1/CMP.8, UNFCCC, 2013), at  
para. 21.   
15  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October 
to 10 November 2001. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties. 
Volume I, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, (5/CP.7, UNFCCC, 2002), at para. 11 (hereinafter UNFCCC 
2001 Report).    
16  Ibid. 
17 Ibid.  
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change”.18 In order to fund the elements of the LDC Work Programme, including 
NAPAs, parties at COP 7 created the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF).19 At 
the same conference, parties also established the Special Climate Change Fund 
(SCCF) to provide funding for projects relating to a number of different areas, 
including adaptation.20 Both the LDCF and the SCCF are managed by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) and depend on voluntary contributions from donors.  
 
At COP 11 in 2005, the Nairobi Work Programme was created. The Programme, 
undertaken under the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA), has the objective of assisting all parties, in particular developing 
country parties, to “improve their understanding and assessment of impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to climate change” and to “make informed decisions on 
practical adaptation actions and measures to respond to climate change on a sound 
scientific, technical and socio-economic basis, taking into account current and future 
climate change and variability”.21 The Programme became operational in 2006.  
 
At COP 16 in 2010, parties adopted the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF), 
which resulted from three years of negotiations following the adoption of the Bali 
Action Plan. The CAF affirms that adaptation requires the same level of priority as 
mitigation and commits parties to enhanced action on adaptation.22 This includes the 
planning, prioritization, and implementation of adaptation actions; the undertaking of 
impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments; the strengthening of institutional 
capacities and knowledge systems; and the building of resilience in socio-economic 
and ecological systems.23 The CAF also established an Adaptation Committee to 
promote coherent enhanced action on adaptation, and introduced a process to enable 
LDCs to create National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) as a means of identifying and 
addressing medium- and long-term adaptation needs24.  
 
Parties in Cancun furthermore agreed to establish the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF), with developed country parties committing to jointly mobilize US$100 billion 
per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.25 The funding is to be 
used for mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfer, and capacity 
building activities.26 GCF funds are to be “new and additional” and raised from public 
and private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative sources.27 Developed country 
parties also committed to providing US$30 billion in “fast start” climate financing by 
                                                
18  UNFCCC, Chronological Evolution of the LDC Work Programme and Introduction to the Concept 
of NAPA, online: UNFCCC <www.unfccc.int>. 
19  UNFCCC 2001 Report, supra note 15, at para. 12. 
20  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October 
to 10 November 2001. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties. 
Volume I, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, (7/CP.7, UNFCCC, 2002).  
21  See generally Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eleventh Session, Held at Montreal 
from 28 November to 10 December 2005: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of 
the Parties at its Eleventh Session, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, (2/CP.11, UNFCCC, 2006), at 5. 
22  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November 
to 10 December 2010: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
Sixteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, (1/CP.16, UNFCCC, 2011), at 1. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid., at para. 15. 
25 Ibid., at para. 98. 
26  Ibid., at para. 95. 
27  Ibid., at paras. 95, 99 and 101. 
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2012, with a balanced allocation between adaptation for “the most vulnerable 
developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing 
States and Africa”, and mitigation.28  
 
At Doha (COP 18) in 2012, parties approved a three-year work plan for the 
Adaptation Committee, as well as the National Adaptation Plan technical guidelines.29 
The Adaptation Committee’s work plan includes efforts to increase coherence and 
find synergies in the adaptation work of both Convention and non-Convention bodies, 
and the provision of knowledge and technical support for developing countries 
engaged in adaptation planning and implementation.30 The Adaptation Committee 
also supports the creation of NAPs by LDC and non-LDC developing countries.31  
 
Finally, in Doha the Parties agreed to establish at COP 19 “institutional 
arrangements, such as an international mechanism” to address loss and damage 
resulting from climate change impacts in developing countries that are “particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”.32 This resulted in the Warsaw 
international mechanism for loss and damage under the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework, agreed to in 2013.33 The aim of the Warsaw international mechanism is 
to promote “the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change”, for example, by enhancing knowledge, 
increasing coordination among stakeholders and enhancing action and support 
(including finance and technology).34 However, there is still no definition of loss and 
damage under the UNFCCC and the relationship to adaptation is not entirely clear. 
Nishat et al. define loss and damage as “current or future negative impacts of climate 
change that will not be addressed by adaptation efforts”.35  
 
COP decisions have time and again stressed the importance of the development 
and transfer of technologies. Initially, to enhance the implementation of Article 4.5 of 
the UNFCCC, the parties agreed to work together on a set of technology transfer 
activities. This resulted in the technology transfer framework36, which identifies five 
key themes and areas for meaningful and effective actions, namely, technology needs 
                                                
28  Ibid., at para. 95. 
29  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November 
to 8 December 2012: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
Eighteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, (1/CP.18, UNFCCC, 2013), at 3. The development of 
the technical guidelines were developed by the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG).  
30  Adaptation Committee, Three-year Workplan of the Adaptation Committee, online: UNFCCC, 
<unfccc.int>.   
31  Least Developed Countries Expert Group, National Adaptation Plans: Technical Guidelines for the 
National Adaptation Plan Process (Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat, 2012).  
32  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November 
to 8 December 2012: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
Eighteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, (3/CP.18, UNFCCC, 2013), at 21. 
33  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 
November 2013: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
Nineteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, (2/CP.19, UNFCCC, 2014), at 6. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ainun Nishat, Nandan Mukherjee, Erin Roberts, and Anna Hasemann, 'Loss & Damage: A Range 
of Approaches to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts in Bangladesh (Bonn, 
Germany: Germanwatch, 2013), at 7. 
36  UNFCCC, Decision 4/CP.7, 'Framework for Meaningful and Effective Actions to Enhance the 
Implementation of Article 4, Paragraph 5, of the Convention', FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, (2002), at 
24. 
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and needs assessments, technology information, enabling environments, capacity 
building, and mechanisms for technology transfer. It also provided for the creation of 
an expert group on technology transfer, which seeks to analyse and identify ways to 
facilitate and advance technology transfer activities.37  The Cancun Agreements led to 
the establishment of a Technology Mechanism with two components, namely, the 
Technology Executive Committee an the Climate Technology Centre and Network. 
The Technology Executive Committee identifies technology needs, recommends 
guidance on priorities, recommends actions to overcome barriers and catalyzes the 
development and use of technology action plans. The Climate Technology Centre and 
Network has as its mission to “stimulate technology cooperation and … enhance the 
development and transfer of technologies and to assist developing country Parties at 
their request, consistent with their respective capabilities and national circumstances 
and priorities.”38  
 
The Global Environment Facility also plays a role in effectuating transfers of 
environmentally sound technologies to developing countries. Of the two UNFCCC 
funds administered by the GEF, the SCCF specifically aims to support the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies to developing countries. Technology transfer also 
occurs under the LDCF.39 At the 13th COP, the GEF was called upon to develop a 
program to promote investment in technology transfer so as to help developing 
countries to adopt environmentally sound technologies (ESTs).  In 2008, the GEF 
Council and the LDCF/SCCF Council discussed and approved the Strategic Program 
on Technology Transfer. Subsequently, the 14th session of the COP welcomed the 
GEF’s Strategic Program on Technology Transfer, renaming it the Poznan Strategic 
Program on Technology Transfer. The Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology 
Transfer is seen as an important development towards scaling up investment in 
technology transfer and help developing countries access environmentally sound 
technologies.40 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) also plays a 
role in facilitating technology development and transfer through its technology needs 
assessment project, which is designed to assist developing country Parties in 
determining their technology priorities for climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
 
 
2.  THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ADAPTATION 
 
There is no question that adaptation has now become a core element of the 
Convention. Over the past decade, the number of bodies and processes related to 
adaptation has grown rapidly. Negotiators are now considering how adaptation should 
be addressed under the post-2020 climate regime. With the Adaptation Committee 
and NAP process both in their early stages, and the Green Climate Fund under 
development, the architecture envisioned under the Cancun Adaptation Framework is 
gradually coming into place. To some extent, this has left Parties in a state of “wait 
                                                
37  UNFCCC, Decision 4/CP.7, 'Terms of Reference of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer', 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, (2002), at 31. 
38 UNFCCC, Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int 
/2860.php>. 
39 See generally GEF, 'Technology Transfer for Climate Change', in Fact Sheets about the GEF (June, 
2009). 
40 GEF, Poznan Strategic Program on Technology Transfer, online: GEF 
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/ho me>. 
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and see”. How the Framework does or does not deliver will clearly influence the 
directions that negotiations on a new climate deal will take.  
 
Despite the progress made so far, the glaring lack of adequate and predictable 
funding available for adaptation in developing countries remains a serious obstacle. 
The funding required to adequately support adaptation has been estimated at between 
US$70 billion and US$100 billion per year.41 So far, the UNFCCC’s financial 
mechanisms have provided just a small fraction of this. The Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund have collectively raised 
US$863 million and disbursed US$244 million,42 while the Adaptation Fund has 
generated US$325 million and disbursed $58 million.43 Of the roughly $30 billion in 
“new and additional” Fast Start Finance that was provided by developed countries 
over 2010-2012, only a small share was directed to support adaptation, with the bulk 
allotted for mitigation activities.44 While developing countries in Doha demanded that 
developed countries commit to scaled up climate finance for the pre-2020 period, 
developed countries only agreed to maintain current funding levels.45  
 
The UNFCCC established a work programme on long-term finance at COP 17 
to make progress on scaling up the funding available for developing countries.46 In 
the work programme’s 2012 report, the programme co-chairs state that “substantial 
increases in financial resources are needed in order to help developing countries to 
limit and reduce GHG emissions, and to adapt to the impacts of climate change”, and 
recommend a political process focused on “sources and options for mobilizing climate 
finance in the short, medium and long terms”.47 Additionally, they call for increased 
clarity and predictability in the delivery of climate finance, strengthened tracking of 
climate finance, improved identification of adaptation needs, enhanced enabling 
environments in developing countries and the establishment of a regular forum on 
climate finance.48  
 
Various options for generating new climate finance have been proposed and 
studied, most notably by the UN Secretary-General’s high-level advisory group on 
climate change financing (AGF).49 The AGF identified options that include the 
auctioning of emission allowances, a global carbon tax, an emissions trading levy and 
                                                
41  Urvashi Narain, Sergio Margulis and Timothy Essam, 'Estimating Costs of Adaptation to Climate 
Change', 11(3) Climate Policy 1001 (2011), at 1007. 
42  Climate Funds Update, Climate Fund Profiles, online: Climate Funds Update, <http://www.c 
limatefundsupdate.org/> (hereinafter Climate Funds Update). 
43  The World Bank, 2013, Trustee Presentation: Update on Status of Resources and CER 
Monetization, Adaptation Fund Trustee, The World Bank, AFB/B.21/Inf.4 (2013).  
44 Taryn Fransen and Smita Nakhooda, '5 Insights from Developed Countries' Fast-Start Finance 
Contributions', World Resources Institute Blog, 11 June 2013, online: WRI <http://www.wri.org/>.      
45  Jennifer Morgan, 'Reflections on COP 18 in Doha: Negotiators Made Only Incremental Progress', 
World Resources Institute Blog, 14 December 2012, online: WRI <http://www.wri.org/>.    
46  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 
November to 11 December 2011: Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Seventeenth Session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, (2/CP.17, UNFCCC, 2012), at 4.   
47 Report on the Workshops of the Work Programme on Long-term Finance: Note by the Co-chairs, 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 18th Sess., Item 11(a) 
of the Provisional Agenda, FCCC/CP/2012/3 (2012), at paras. 8, 10 (hereinafter LTF). 
48 Ibid., at paras. 10-14. 
49  See generally UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate 
Change Financing (New York: UN, 2010) (hereinafter AGF).  
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a tax on international shipping and air travel.50 The work programme on long-term 
finance co-chairs acknowledge these proposals, yet stop short of making specific 
recommendations. Instead, they note that no single source of climate finance 
identified would generate sufficient financial resources and that a combination of 
sources is likely to be required.51 Such a combination, the co-chairs note, “should be 
subject to further international and national analysis and discussion.”52 
 
The work programme on long-term finance was extended at COP 18 until the 
end of 2013, with a mandate to “inform developed country Parties in their efforts to 
identify pathways for mobilizing scaled-up climate finance to USD 100 billion per 
year by 2020”.53 Other UNFCCC processes and bodies involved in trying to scale up 
climate finance include the Standing Committee on Finance (responsible for the 
financial mechanism of the Convention), the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation 
Fund. Of these, only the Adaptation Fund has support for adaptation as its primary 
mandate.  
 
While adaptation is clearly receiving more attention at the negotiations than a 
decade ago, it still lags behind mitigation in financial resources. Adaptation funding 
has been criticized by developing countries as “piecemeal” and not matched to the 
needs of the most vulnerable countries.54 For this reason, developing countries are 
seeking assurances that in a new climate deal a “significant proportion”55 or 
“balanced allocation” of climate funds be allocated to adaptation.56  
 
As far as the technology aspect of adaptation is concerned, the emerging regime 
will be challenged to resolve issues relating to intellectual property rights and to 
provide for increased action on technology development and transfer, including 
research and development, demonstration, deployment, and diffusion of technology. 
Issues relating to financing such technology transfers will also have to be resolved in 
the new regime. To date, much of the debate in this area has related to mitigation 
technology. While there may be some opportunities for integrated solutions, 
technologies for adaptation largely differ from those needed for mitigation.57 It is 
therefore essential that any emerging regime on climate change consider 
environmentally sound technologies for adaptation as a discrete class.  
 
 
3.  ADAPTATION IN BANGLADESH 
  
                                                
50  Ibid.  
51  LTF, supra note 47, at para. 21.     
52  Ibid.  
53  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November 
to 8 December 2012: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
Eighteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, (4/CP.18, UNFCCC, 2013), at 25. 
54  Long-term Finance (COP), Submission by the Republic of Nauru on Behalf of the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS): Views from Parties on Long-term Finance, online: UNFCCC <https://unfcc 
c.int/2860.php>. 
55 Ibid. 
56  Submission by Nepal on behalf of the Group of the Least Developed Countries on Experiences on 
the Application of Guidelines for the Formulation of National Adaptation Plan Process for Least 
Developed Countries (8 February 2013), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>. 
57  UNFCCC, Technologies for Adaptation, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
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Climate change poses a threat to all countries, but nowhere is the threat greater 
than in LDCs such as Bangladesh. Developing countries, with their low resilience and 
low adaptive capacities, their typically warmer baseline climates, high reliance on 
agriculture and increased exposure to extreme events, are expected to suffer the 
most.58 This is the case despite the fact that the world’s poorest nations have 
historically contributed the least to the problem of anthropogenic climate change.59  
 
Already, developing countries are suffering the brunt of climate change impacts.  
Firm predictions both in terms of human and economic impact are difficult to make 
with precision, but he general trends are clear. Today, climate change is estimated by 
some to cause an average of 400,000 deaths per year, over 98 percent of which occur 
in developing countries.60 By 2030, the total number of climate change-related deaths 
is predicted to rise significantly, particularly in developing countries.61  
 
The economic costs are similarly staggering. In 2010, economic losses attributed 
to climate change amounted to close to 1 percent of global GDP, or $700 billion 
(2010 PPP).62 Developing countries bear an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the total 
economic costs.63 This will have a major impact on these countries’ abilities to reach 
sustainable development goals. In Bangladesh alone, an estimated US$2.7 billion of 
the government’s development investments are at risk due to climate change.64 
  
Among developing countries, Bangladesh stands out both for its exceptional 
vulnerability to climate change and for its ongoing efforts to adapt to the already 
serious impacts. Bangladesh has been more active than most in attempting to adapt to 
climate change. These efforts have taken place both within the UNFCCC’s adaptation 
framework and outside of it. As a result, Bangladesh’s experience may offer a good 
indication of the extent to which the UNFCCC’s adaptation efforts are effective. 
 
a.  The climate threat to Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh has been described as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries 
in the world.65 Most of its land area is low-lying, comprised of the deltaic plains of 
the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers. Eighty percent of the country is in 
floodplains and riverbank erosion poses a severe and constant threat. Two-thirds of 
Bangladesh is less than five metres above sea level, making the country highly 
                                                
58  Martin Parry, Nigel Arnell, Tony McMichael, Robert Nicholls, Pim Martens, Sari Kovats, Matthew 
Livermore, Cynthia Rosenzweig, Ana Iglesias and Gunther Fischer, 'Millions at Risk: Defining 
Critical Climate Change Threats and Targets',  11(3) Global Environmental Change 181 (2011), at 
181-183. 
59  Robert Mendelsohn, 'The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries', 
3(2) Climate Change Economics1 (2012), at 2. 
60  Dara and the Climate Vulnerable Forum, Climate Vulnerability Monitor: A Guide to the Cold 
Calculus of a Hot Planet, 2nd ed, (Spain: Fundacion DARA Internacional, 2012) at 17, 19. 
61  Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  
63  Ibid., at 19.  
64  Merylyn Hedger, 'Climate Finance in Bangladesh: Lessons for Development Cooperation and 
Climate Finance at National Level' (Working Paper No. 12, EDC2020, Bonn, 2011), at 31.      
65  Sven Harmeling and David Eckstein, Global Climate Risk Index 2013: Who Suffers Most from 
Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2011 and 1992 to 2011, (Bonn: 
Germanwatch e.V., 2012), at 6.    
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vulnerable to sea level rise.66 Large populations live within the most vulnerable areas, 
which are also home to a major portion of the Sunderbans, the world’s largest single 
track of mangrove forest. It is estimated that with a 45 cm sea level rise (which is 
expected by the year 2050), 75 percent of the Sundarbans will be inundated.67  On 
average, a quarter of the country is inundated by sea-water every year.68 In addition, 
monsoon rains and melting Himalayan glaciers result in annual river flooding. Erratic 
rainfall exposes the country to severe droughts, particularly in the north and 
northwestern regions.69  
 
Despite being home to hundreds of rivers, access to drinking water is limited. 
Arsenic contamination of both ground and surface water is a major problem 
compounded by increased salinity affecting about 20 million coastal residents.70 
Increased salt-water intrusion is contributing to the top dying of Sundari trees in the 
Sunderbans and is affecting local fisheries. 71   
 
The 2013 Global Climate Risk Index lists Bangladesh as having the fourth 
highest rate of mortality and economic losses due to weather-related events from 
1992-2011.72 As a result of its direct proximity to the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh 
experiences frequent tropical cyclones, and these have had a historically devastating 
impact on those living close to sea level. Between 1980-2000, more than 250,000 
people died as a result of tropical cyclones, with 60 percent of those deaths occurring 
in Bangladesh.73  A 2007 cyclone in southern Bangladesh killed more than 5,000 
people.  
 
Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of many of 
these events. In a 2013 report, the World Bank characterized Bangladesh as a future 
impact “hotspot” due to “increasing and compounding challenges occurring in the 
same timeframe from extreme river floods, more intense tropical cyclones, rising sea 
                                                
66 Robert J. Nicholls, Poh Poh Wong, Virginia Burkett, Jorge Codignotto, John Hay, Roger McLean, 
Sachooda Ragoonaden, and Colin D. Woodroffe, 'Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas', in 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by M.L. 
Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007),  at 326.    
67  Environment Directorate Development Co-Operation Directorate, Shardul Agrawala, Tomoko Ota, 
Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, Joel Smith, and Maarten van Aalst, Working Party on Global and Structural 
Policies, Working Party on Development Co-operation and Environment, Development and 
Climate Change in Bangladesh: Focus on Coastal Flooding and the Sundarbans, 
COM/ENV/EPOC/DCD/DAC(2003)3/FINAL (OECD, 2003), at 19.  
68  Aka Firowz Ahmad, Community Based Adaptation to Climate Change in Bangladesh: The Global 
Initiative at Local Level, online: Monash University < http://www.iec.monash.edu.au/>.   
69  N.C. Dey, M.S. Alam, A.K. Sajjan, M.A. Bhuiyan, L. Ghose, Y. Ibaraki and F. Karim, 'Assessing 
Environmental and Health Impact of Drought in the Northwest Bangladesh', 4(2) Journal of 
Environmental Science and Natural Resources 89 (2011). 
70  The World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for 
Resilience (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013), at 109 (hereinafter World Bank, Turn Down 
the Heat).   
71  Ainun Nishat and Nandan Mukherjee, 'Sea Level Rise and Its Impacts in Coastal Areas of 
Bangladesh', in Climate Change Adaptation Actions in Bangladesh, edited by Rajib Shaw, Fuad 
Mallick, and Aminul Islam (Japan: Springer, 2013), at 47. 
72 Harmeling and Eckstein, supra note 66, at 6. 
73  Nicholls, Wong, Burkett, Codignotto, Hay, McLean, Ragoonaden, and Woodroffe, supra note 67, at 
338. 
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levels, extraordinarily high temperatures, and declining crop yields.”74 A combination 
of more intense tropical cyclones and sea level rise would increase the impact of 
floods and storm surges, thus reducing arable land.75 This will have a serious impact 
on food production as well as livelihoods, given the fact that two thirds of the 
workforce is employed in agriculture.76 The IPCC has estimated that production of 
rice and wheat could drop by 8 percent and 32 percent respectively by the year 
2050.77 Climate migration is expected to increase as people relocate from areas that 
have become inundated with water.78  
 
While Bangladesh is primarily rural, the capital Dhaka is one of the most 
populated cities in the world. There has been an increasing flow of people from rural 
areas to the capital in search of better economic prospects and refuge from climate 
change impacts that have ravaged rural areas.79 This has placed a tremendous strain 
on basic services in Dhaka. Moreover, four flood-prone rivers flank the national 
capital, and since the majority of the slum and squatter settlements in this city are 
located in low-lying land areas, they run the risk of being flooded. Waterlogging and 
inundation, in turn, pose serious health risks. The situation is similar in other cities, 
such as Chittagong, Khulna, Sylhet, and Rajshahi.80  
 
Bangladesh’s climate vulnerability is heightened by its low adaptive capacity. 
Bangladesh remains a poor country, with a per capita GDP of about US$732.81  While 
recent economic growth may have improved the ability of the government and 
individuals to pay for adaptation measures, development has also brought 
environmental degradation and increased climate sensitivity. As well, Bangladesh 
suffers from weak governance, with corruption endemic in the public sector.82 IN 
short, it is the combination of Bangladesh’s low capacity and its high exposure to 
adverse climate events that makes it particularly vulnerable to climate change. 
  
b.  Adaptation Efforts in Bangladesh  
 
 While climate change adaptation is a relatively recent concern for much of the 
world, the government of Bangladesh has long been active in its attempts to reduce its 
exposure to adverse climate impacts. The country’s experience with devastating 
tropical cyclones and other weather-related events has helped make climate 
adaptation a national priority. Since 1974, the government has spent over US$10 
billion (at constant 2007 prices) to increase the country’s climate resilience and 
                                                
74  World Bank, Turn Down the Heat, supra note 71, at 110. 
75  Ibid., at 129. 
76  Ibid.  
77  Nicholls, Wong, Burkett, Codignotto, Hay, McLean, Ragoonaden, and Woodroffe, supra note 67, at 
480. 
78  World Bank, Turn Down the Heat, supra note 71, at 138. 
79  The Brahmaputra and the Jamuna rivers alone have contributed to one million rural inhabitants 
being driven into poverty, forcing them to relocate, to cities in search of work. Sabina Faiz Rashid, 
Showkat Gani, and Malabika Sarker, 'Urban Poverty, Climate Change and Health Risks for Slum 
Dwellers in Bangladesh', in Climate Change Adaptation Actions in Bangladesh, edited by Rajib 
Shaw, Fuad Mallick, and Aminul Islam (Japan: Springer, 2013), at 57. 
80  Ibid., at 59.  
81  The World Bank, 2013, GDP Per Capita (Current US$), online: The World Bank, 
<data.worldbank.org>.   
82 Transparency International, 2013, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, online: TI 
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disaster preparedness.83 In 2003, the government established a Comprehensive 
Disaster Management Programme (CDMP). Now in its second phase, the program 
aims to reduce vulnerability through an integrated approach to disaster management 
and climate change.84 Climate change concerns have been built into Bangladesh’s 
Coastal Zone Policy, National Water Policy, and Poverty Reduction Strategy.85 
 
 The country’s extreme vulnerability to cyclones, floods, and droughts has 
helped it become an international leader in dealing with climate change impacts. As a 
climate hotspot, Bangladesh has been able to benefit from the work and the insights of 
NGOs and climate researchers already active within the country.86 This, along with 
effective communication between research organizations, government, and civil 
society has helped spur the country to play an active role within the UNFCCC 
process.87 Bangladesh has participated in all UNFCCC negotiations and chaired the 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) group from 2004-2006.88 As well, the country has 
contributed multiple IPCC lead authors.89 
 
 In 2005, Bangladesh became the first country to submit a NAPA to the 
UNFCCC.90 This document identifies priority activities intended to address urgent 
and immediate adaptation needs. This was followed by the Bangladesh Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2008.91 The BCCSAP focuses on 
strategic medium- and long-term actions, and is the key adaptation policy document 
for the government. In 2010, the government produced the Strategic Program for 
Climate Resilience (SPCR). The SPCR includes some of the same activities as the 
NAPA and BCCSAP, but is to be implemented with funding from the World Bank’s 
Climate Investment Funds’ Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR). 
 
 Concerned about insufficient funding available under the UNFCCC, the 
government created two national funds with which to finance its adaptation activities. 
The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) is supported entirely by the 
government’s own budget, while the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF) depends on developed country pledges. Together, the BCCTF and BCCRF 
have raised more than US$500 million.92  
 
                                                
83  Bangladesh, Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (Dhaka: Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, 2009) at xvii (hereinafter BCCSAP).  
84  CDMP, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Comprehensive Disaster Management 
Programme (Phase II), online: CDMP < http://www.cdmp.org.bd/index.php>. 
85  Jessica Ayers, Mozaharul Alam and Saleemul Huq, 'Adaptation in Bangladesh', 72 Tiempo 9 
(2009), at 11 (hereinafter Ayers, Alam and Huq, 'Adaptation').   
86  Ibid., at 10.  
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid. 
90  See generally Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forest, National Adaptation Programme of 
Action (NAPA), Final Report (November 2005) (hereinafter NAPA 2005). 
91  Merylyn Hedger and Golam Rabbani, 'Country-driven Approaches to Climate Finance: Insights 
from Bangladesh' (GIZ, 2012), at 2.   
92  See generally BCCRF, The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund, online: BCCRF 
<http://bccrf-bd.org/> (hereinafter BCCRF); see also Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and 
Forests, Climate Change Unit, Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund, online: Ministry of 
Environment and Forests <http://www.moef.gov.bd/index.php> (hereinafter BCCTF).    
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 Outside of strictly adaptation-focused initiatives, adaptation in Bangladesh is 
also supported by significant amounts of official development assistance (ODA). 
Increasingly, development partners such as CARE, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and the United Nations Development Program are designing 
projects within which adaptation concerns are “mainstreamed”. In many cases, it is 
difficult to determine to what extent a project is “traditional” ODA, and to what extent 
it supports adaptation.   
 
 The following sections provide a more in-depth look at the key adaptation 
plans, projects and initiatives in Bangladesh. While it can be difficult to judge the 
effectiveness of adaptation actions given the inherent uncertainty of future climate 
conditions, the complexity of adaptation strategies and the lack of easily measurable 
outputs compared to mitigation, some strengths and weaknesses of the different 
adaptation elements can nevertheless be observed. Taken together, this can help 
provide a sense of how effectively adaptation is being supported in Bangladesh, and 
where improvements need to be made. 
 
i. National Adaptation Programme of Action 
 
 The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) for Bangladesh was 
prepared by the country’s Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) and 
submitted to the UNFCCC in 2005.93 The NAPA was created following the principles 
established by the LDC Expert Group, with US$200,000 contributed by the Least 
Developed Countries Fund.94 Bangladesh was the first country to submit a NAPA. 
Since then, all of the remaining 47 LDCs have submitted NAPAs.  
 
Bangladesh’s NAPA identifies 15 priority adaptation strategies, including 
coastal afforestation to reduce climate impacts, the provision of drinking water to 
coastal communities suffering from increased salinity, capacity building for climate 
change mainstreaming, and the distribution of climate change information to 
vulnerable communities. The NAPA was updated in 2009 with an additional 45 
adaptation measures spread across six thematic areas: research and knowledge 
management; agriculture, fisheries and livestock; heath; building climate resilient 
infrastructure; disaster management; livelihood; biodiversity; and policy and 
institutional capacity building.95 Eighteen short- and medium-term projects are 
identified to help implement these measures.96 
 
The first NAPA project to be approved was the 2007 Community Based 
Adaptation to Climate Change through Coastal Afforestation Program. The project is 
a partnership between the GEF, which contributed US$3.3 million from the LDCF, 
the government, which contributed US$1 million, and the UNDP, which is 
implementing the project and contributed a further US$1 million.97 The four-year 
                                                
93  NAPA 2005, supra note 91. 
94  Global Environment Facility (GEF), Detail of GEF Project #2026, online: GEF <http://www.theg 
ef.org/gef/project_detail?projID=2026>.    
95  Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forest, National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(NAPA) (Dhaka: Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2009), at 2. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Global Environment Facility (GEF), Bangladesh – Community-based Adaptation to Climate 
Change through Coastal Afforestation, online: GEF <http://www.thegef.org/gef/>.   
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project aims to reduce the vulnerability of coastal communities through coastal 
afforestation (which reduces the impact of tidal surges) and the diversification of 
livelihoods, while strengthening the climate planning capacities of all levels of 
government, improving the community responsiveness element of coastal 
management policies and developing a system for collecting, distributing and 
internalizing climate knowledge.98  
 
In 2011, a second NAPA priority project was approved by the GEF. With 
US$5.65 million in funding from the LDCF and over US$40 million in co-funding, 
this project, entitled Integrating Community-Based Adaptation into Coastal 
Afforestation and Reforestation Programs in Bangladesh, is a considerable expansion 
of the earlier afforestation project.99 It is designed to further increase resilience 
through the planting of mangrove and other tree species, the adoption of planting 
techniques that improve climate resilience, and the increased participation of 
communities in the management and protection of new greenbelt structures. 
 
To date, these are Bangladesh’s only NAPA projects to secure approval and 
funding from the LDCF, although the UNDP reports that many of the priority 
adaptation activities have been or are being addressed in ongoing adaptation 
projects.100 To put the support of Bangladesh projects into a broader context, the 
LDCF has approved 82 projects in developing countries with grants amounting to 
US$358 million.101 This represents a small fraction of the priority projects detailed in 
developing countries’ NAPAs, a situation that has led to frustration in many 
developing countries, not just Bangladesh.102 There have also been concerns from a 
range of actors about the quality of NAPAs, their lack of local and national 
ownership, and their low status in the wider UNFCCC process.103  
 
ii.  The Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 
 
 The MOEF published its key policy framework for addressing climate change, 
the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2008. The 
impetus for the BCCSAP was the damage caused by Cyclones Sidr and Aila, and the 
recognition that a more strategic and coordinated approach to adaptation was 
needed.104 The BCCSAP was designed to help achieve a government strategy for pro-
poor, climate resilient and low carbon development based around the four building 
blocks of the Bali Action Plan: adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and 
                                                
98  Amireeta K. Rawlani and Benjamin K. Sovacool, 'Building Responsiveness to Climate Change 
through Community Based Adaptation in Bangladesh', 16(8) Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies 
for Global Change 845 (2011), at 857.   
99  UNDP Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM), Integrating Community-Based Adaptation into 
Coastal Afforestation and Reforestation Programs in Bangladesh, online: UNDP-ALM <undp-al 
m.org>.   
100  Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM), Country Profile - Bangladesh: Overview, online: ALM 
<htt p://www.adaptationlearning.net/country-profiles/bd>.   
101  Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), Submission Under the Work Programme on 
Long-term Finance, Decision 4/CP.18, Paragraph 5 (2013), at 3, online: UNFCCC 
<https://unfccc.int /2860.php>.  
102  Asa Persson, 'Institutionalising Climate Adaptation Finance under the UNFCCC and Beyond: 
Could an Adaptation ‘Market’ Emerge?' (Working Paper No 2011-03, Stockholm Environment 
Institute, 2011), at 18.     
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adequate and timely flows of investment funds.105 It details a 10-year plan to build 
capacity and resilience to meet the challenge of climate change over the following 20-
25 years.106 Included is a list of 44 programs designed to be implemented by various 
ministries. 
 
The BCCSAP is based on six themes: food security, social protection and 
health; comprehensive disaster management; infrastructure; research and knowledge 
management; mitigation and low-carbon development; and capacity building and 
institutional strengthening.107 It expands upon Bangladesh’s NAPA, while providing 
more strategic medium- and long-term direction on climate change. The government 
describes the BCCSAP as a “living document”, able to be changed to reflect “new 
scientific findings, development priorities of the country and the pace and nature of 
international negotiations.”108 In fact, it has already been updated. It was revised in 
2009 after a new government came to power, amid criticisms that the earlier version 
used international consultants, failed to adequately consult stakeholders, and 
overemphasized infrastructure.109 
 
 Bangladesh has been described as “ahead of the game” compared to other 
developing countries in its preparation of a national climate change strategy.110 Still, 
the BCCSAP has been criticized for not being comprehensive enough. It has been 
described as a “knowledge strategy”, when what is needed is an implementation 
strategy, with a costed and sequenced delivery framework111 and actions prioritized 
on the basis of vulnerability.112 It has been criticized for inadequately considering the 
role of local governments in facilitating adaptation.113 As well, the plan is not backed 
up with funds or specific laws and policies.114 
 
iii.  The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund and the Bangladesh Climate 
Change Resilience Fund 
 
 After preparing the BCCSAP, Bangladesh’s government decided that 
immediate action was needed to implement the plan’s activities.115 Rather than wait 
for international finance to arrive, the government elected to create a new fund drawn 
from the national budget.  The first fund of its kind, the Bangladesh Climate Change 
Trust Fund (BCCTF) allows government and civil society groups to apply for funding 
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on a project-by-project basis. The BCCTF became operational in 2009 with a US$100 
million budgetary allocation.116 This was followed by further allocations in each of 
the following three years, bringing the total to US$350 million as of December 
2012.117  
 
In 2010, the Climate Change Trust Fund Act was passed. It limits climate 
change project spending to 66 percent of the BCCTF’s resources, with the remainder 
reserved for emergencies.118 So far, more than 100 climate change projects have been 
approved under the BCCTF, with the highest portion of funding (44 percent) going to 
infrastructure, and the lowest portion (2 percent) spent on capacity building and 
institutional strengthening.119 BCCTF-approved projects have so far covered 
adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, research and knowledge management, 
among other areas.120 Projects are approved by a Board of Trustees made up primarily 
of government ministers, with two spots for civil society organizations. The Board is 
chaired by the Minister of Environment.  
 
 The government recognized from the outset that domestic funding would not 
be enough to fully support the implementation of the BCCSAP, and that significant 
international contributions would be needed.121 This led to the creation of the 
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF). Like the BCCTF, the 
BCCRF’s sole purpose is to finance activities under the BCCSAP, however, in place 
of domestic sources of funding, the BCCRF is funded through developed country 
contributions. As of 2013, the fund had raised US$170 million.122  
 
 The BCCRF has approved funding for 10 projects totaling US$147 million.123 
Funding decisions are made by a 16-member Governing Council made up of 
government ministers and representatives from the Prime Minister’s Office and 
Planning Commission, development partners and civil society.124 The Minister of 
Environment acts as Chair. As with the BCCTF, government and civil society can 
apply for funding on a project basis.   
 
The design and operation of the BCCRF have been controversial. As a 
precondition to contributing funds, developed countries insisted on a governing role 
for the World Bank.125 This was opposed by civil society groups, and, at least 
initially, by the government.126 Subsequently, the World Bank was granted an interim 
trusteeship that sees it receive 4.5 percent of the BCCRF’s resources as a service 
charge in return for providing technical assistance, oversight and due diligence.127 In 
2012, civil society groups protested the World Bank’s effort to retain control over the 
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BCCRF instead of transferring control to the government after its interim trusteeship 
had ended.128 The World Bank’s governance has been criticized as undemocratic, and 
concerns have also been raised about the “complex and lengthy” process required to 
receive funding.129 
 
The BCCTF has been subject to criticism. In addition to concerns about the 
limited funds allocated for capacity building, the fund has faced allegations of 
corruption and bias in its allocation decisions.130 The government has taken some 
steps to address these allegations through increased civil society oversight.131 
However, the high proportion of government ministers on the Board of Trustees 
continues to leave funding decisions vulnerable to undue political influence.132 In 
some cases, projects have been funded that have no clear link to climate change or 
that are clearly ineffective or even maladaptive.133 Furthermore, local consultations 
with the people most vulnerable to the effects of climate change have not taken 
place.134 
 
iv.  The Strategic Program for Climate Resilience Bangladesh 
 
 In 2010, Bangladesh became one of nine countries (two regions are also 
included) selected to take part in the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR). 
The PPCR is a targeted adaptation program of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), 
which is funded through the World Bank-administered Climate Investment Funds 
(CIF).135 The pilot program is intended to help developing countries prepare, 
implement and finance long-term climate resilience programs that are integrated with 
the countries’ core development planning.136 By providing support for country-led, 
programmatic approaches to adaptation that engage the private sector in order to 
leverage donor finance, the PPCR aims to go beyond “business as usual” development 
and provide a new model for global adaptation finance and climate-resistant 
development.137 
 
 The Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR) Bangladesh is 
Bangladesh’s program to implement the PPCR. The SPCR was designed by the 
government in coordination with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), members of 
the World Bank Group, key Bangladeshi stakeholders and other development 
partners.138 It is based upon Bangladesh’s NAPA and BCCSAP, with projects focused 
on increasing resilience in three areas: agriculture and food security, coastal 
embankments and afforestation, and water systems and coastal infrastructure.139 The 
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SPCR also includes two technical assistance projects. The first, the ADB-
implemented “Climate Change Capacity Building and Knowledge Management” 
project, aims to comprehensively assess Bangladesh’s institutional capacity for public 
and private sector climate resilience planning.140  The second, to be implemented by 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), is the “Feasibility Study for a Pilot 
Program of Climate Resilient Housing in the Coastal Region”, which looks at 
potential ways to provide effective, low-cost shelters to protect humans and livestock 
from cyclone winds and monsoon rains.141   
 
The PPCR has provided US$110 million in grants (45 percent) and near-zero 
interest credits (55 percent) to help fund the preparation and implementation of the 
SPCR.142 It anticipates that Bangladesh will be able to use these funds to leverage an 
additional US$461.6 million in private financing.143 So far, it has funded seven 
preparation grants and approved US$30 million in financing for a coastal resilient 
infrastructure project.144  
 
While the PPCR’s innovative approach has been viewed optimistically, its 
execution has been criticized. In Bangladesh, criticism of the PPCR has stemmed 
from the influential role given to multilateral development banks and the use of 
concessional loans to finance adaptation projects.145 There has been less stakeholder 
consultation or buy-in than hoped for (this has been a concern in other PPCR 
countries as well),146 with one or two dominant government ministries able to steer 
the decision-making process towards projects that reflect their interests.147 This has 
resulted in an emphasis towards large-scale engineering projects, which can 
sometimes be inappropriate or counterproductive,148 rather than a full range of 
projects that better reflect the entire country’s needs.149    
 
v.  Official Development Assistance 
 
 Bangladesh has been a significant recipient of official development assistance 
(ODA) for decades. While this aid does not qualify as “new and additional” 
adaptation finance under the UNFCCC, it has nevertheless become an important part 
of the effort to build the country’s climate resilience. Increasingly, development 
agencies are integrating climate change considerations into their ODA programs.150 
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Ayers and Huq have noted that “more than 60 percent of all ODA could be relevant to 
building adaptive capacity and facilitating adaptation.”151  
 
 This creates a dilemma for Banlgadesh.  On the one hand, Bangladesh, along 
with many other developing countries, has pushed to have adaptation assistance under 
the UNFCCC defined as additional to and separate from ODA in order to ensure that 
developed countries did not simply neglect their development obligations and 
reallocate ODA to adaptation assistance. Bangladesh is clear in it position that climate 
change is an additional stressor, on top of underdevelopment, that is caused by 
developed countries and that developed countries have an obligation to pay for.152  
 
On the other hand, of course, development and adaptation efforts in 
Bangladesh are interconnected and need to be integrated. According to Ayers and 
Huq, it is impractical to define adaptation as separate from and additional to 
development, “given that all adaptation must be underpinned by development 
objectives that seek to address the underlying causes of vulnerability.”153 ‘Stand-
alone’ adaptation actions, they argue, cannot be effective when not supported by 
development.154 In short, while it is fair to expect additional funding to assist with 
adaptation, this should not result in silos that artificially separate development and 
adaptation.  
  
 In Bangladesh, development objectives are integrated into the BCCSAP, and 
development partners have attempted to align their investments with the action 
plan.155 Capacity building and technical assistance with respect to climate change 
have been popular development objectives.156 However, there have been 
disagreements between the climate change and development camps with respect to 
priorities. According to Hedger, the tension is between those who believe climate 
change to be “the major, priority problem that will undermine development” and 
those who see it as a “long term issue distracting from urgent problems about hunger 
and poverty.”157 With comparatively few development partners operating on a wide 
scale across Bangladesh, synchronization is difficult.158  
 
Problems aside, few would question that ODA has a major role to play in 
helping developing countries increase their resilience to climate change.  This means 
Bangladesh will have to continue to work to ensure that adaptation assistance is 
additional to ODA, and to develop the capacity to fully integrate its adaptation and 




vi. Technology for Adaptation 
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Bangladesh is primarily an agrarian nation, with widespread poverty, low levels 
of literacy and the absence of a technology culture. Despite these limitations, the 
country has made substantial economic progress in recent years and has developed 
some basic technologies for climate change adaptation. An important innovation in 
this regard is “floating gardens”, developed in response to a fast vanishing natural 
resource - land. The technology is one where water hyacinth and bamboo is used to 
build the base of a raft upon which soil and cow dung is placed and vegetables are 
grown. These floating gardens have contributed to food security during lean phases, 
and they are an alternative source of income for the poor.159 Given the problem of 
increasing salinity, Bangladesh is also investing in rainwater harvesting 
technologies.160 These adaptation measures have been small-scale, however, and not 
of the magnitude required to respond to the severity of the problems posed by climate 
change impacts. 
 
With external assistance, Bangladesh has been able to develop some higher-end 
technology-based interventions to promote climate change adaptation. One area 
where this collaboration has proved fruitful is in the development of early warning 
systems. Millions in the coastal areas of Bangladesh are exposed to the risk of 
flooding. Flood forecasts used to be spread through word of mouth and local media, 
with the consequence that information often arrived late. The Community Flood 
Information System (CFIS) is a project funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development and operated by an American company, Riverside 
Technology, in partnership with the Bangladeshi Center for Environmental and 
Geographic Information Services and the Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Centre. It 
is a five-year project designed to help local communities adapt to floods through a 
system of flood monitoring and forecasting.161 These forecasting technologies have 
enabled Bangladesh to better prepare itself for floods and other extreme weather 
events like cyclones, saving lives and reducing destruction to property.  
 
Bangladesh has established a Ministry of Science and Technology, which has 
the mandate to “make Science and Technology a part of national culture”.162 There 
are several institutions under this Ministry including the Bangladesh Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research. However these institutions are hamstrung by lack 
of funds and recently, the emphasis has shifted from climate to information 
technology.  
 
Importantly, Bangladesh has carried out a technology needs assessment and has 
prepared technology action plans, identifying agriculture and water sectors as priority 
areas. These studies identify a number of measures and explore how technologies for 
adaptation can be utilized. For instance, in relation to the water sector, the needs 
assessment identifies rehabilitation of embankments/dykes; disaster management 
incorporating early warning systems; monitoring of sea level rise, tidal fluctuation, 
salinity intrusion, sedimentation and coastal erosion; tidal river management 
including computer simulation of tidal flow; tidal barriers (sluice gate), and urban 
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Infrastructure development. For agriculture, the technology needs assessment 
identifies the development of salinity-tolerant, drought-tolerant, short-maturing rice 
varieties; establishment of a climate-smart dissemination center; land use planning; 
and establishment of a special agricultural R&D center.163 Ultimately, the technology 
needs assessment emerges as an important management tool that underscores the 
importance of technology in addressing the adaptation issue, and it helps to formulate 
strategies for technology development, use and management.164  
 
vii. Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation 
 
There are several barriers that hamper the effective implementation of 
adaptation actions in Bangladesh. These barriers can be classified into internal and 
external factors. Significantly, the NAPA identifies lack of awareness of the potential 
gravity of the problem and possible responses, the inability to mainstream climate 
change impacts in developing policies, plans and programs in relation to climate 
sensitive sectors and the lack of adequate tools, knowledge and methodologies to 
provide guidance and advice to decision makers.165 These barriers manifest mainly at 
the domestic level and can therefore be classified as internal. External barriers relate 
primarily to difficulties in accessing finance to fund adaptation actions and accessing 
adaptation relevant technologies.  
 
Bangladesh is a least developed country with serious socio-economic 
challenges. It has limited financial resources to invest in adaptation actions and local 
communities have limited adaptive capacities to adjust to climate impacts.166 On the 
human development index, Bangladesh ranks 146.167 Since its carbon footprint is 
negligible, equity demands that developed countries take the lead in providing the 
financial aid and technology needed to carry out the required adaptation actions. 
However, as discussed above, the funds available to carry out adaptation fall far short 
of what is needed to make a perceptible difference on the ground. As well, climate 
change adaptation has to be mainstreamed into socio-economic policies and projects 
aimed at eradicating poverty and enhancing quality of life.  
 
Technology plays an important role in carrying out climate change adaptation. 
Even though Bangladesh has been able to develop technology to support adaptation 
activities in certain core areas, overall progress has nevertheless been insufficient. In 
many instances, attempts to implement adaptation have resulted in maladaptation due 
to lack of access to appropriate technologies. For instance, Bangladesh implemented a 
coastal embankment project, which produced immediate benefits in terms of bringing 
more areas under cultivation. As a result of the failure to ensure proper engineering 
and consideration of the larger environmental implications, within a decade, the 
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protection structures became a major cause of waterlogging and drainage congestion, 
apart from other environmental impacts.168  
 
Even though Bangladesh has made rapid strides in producing salt tolerant 
varieties of rice, which have contributed to food security, the country spends only 
0.62 percent of its GDP on research and development.169 Consequently, Bangladesh 
overall has not been able to generate the requisite technologies and in certain cases it 
lacks the basic science and research and development capacity to internalize and 
adapt foreign technologies. As well, due to weak institutions and lack of enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, there is a danger that foreign companies may be 
discouraged from licensing their technologies. Affected communities may be 
reluctant to adapt to new technologies and therefore steps may have to be taken to 
educate and motivate local communities.  
 
Against the backdrop of these barriers we now examine the role of the 
UNFCCC regime in helping Bangladesh implement appropriate climate change 
adaptation actions.  
 
5.  HOW THE UNFCCC COULD HELP BANGLADESH 
 
 In order to better protect itself against current and anticipated climate change 
impacts, Bangladesh requires increased support from the UNFCCC. Support will have 
to take the form of direct financial assistance and more indirect support to improve 
the capacity of Bangladesh to turn the financial assistance offered into strong 
adaptation capacity. Recent negotiations in Doha and Warsaw made little progress on 
the core issues of adaptation, technology and finance facing Bangladesh. What 
follows is a list of actions, drawn from the case study and the existing literature, that 
the UNFCCC would have to take to better protect Bangladesh and, to the extent that 
the Bangladesh experience is representative, the rest of the world’s most vulnerable 
countries, from the destructive impacts of climate change.  
 
a.  Implement stronger mitigation targets 
 
It is important to recognize at the outset that effective mitigation at a global 
scale is the only effective way to reduce the adaptation burden on developing 
countries.  The situation in Bangladesh offers a perfect illustration of the need for 
effective mitigation.  Not only is its adaptive capacity low, but there a are clearly 
limits to the country’s ability to adapt to unmitigated climate change, no matter how 
much effort is made to improve its climate resilience.  The impact of sea level rise is 
perhaps the most obvious example.  Much can be done to improve resilience to 
gradual and moderate sea level rise in Bangladesh.  At a certain, point, however, 
displacement of millions of citizens becomes inevitable.  
 
The more stringent the mitigation targets, the more climate change is avoided, 
and the more manageable the adaptation challenge in Bangladesh.  Additionally, 
under the Kyoto regime, the more ambitious the targets, the more the flexibility 
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mechanisms are likely to be utilized, which in turn results in increased flow of funds 
into the Adaptation Fund.   
 
On the other hand, if the UNFCCC continues to set weak mitigation targets, 
Bangladesh’s vulnerability will increase further and the costs of adaptation, and, 
eventually, loss and damage, will continue to grow. In short, an ambitious, science-
based mitigation target in the post 2020 regime will be essential, for the sake of 
mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage.  
 
b. Scale up adaptation finance 
 
As a participant in the PPCR and a recipient of significant amounts of 
development aid, Bangladesh already receives more climate-related funding than 
many other developing countries. However, even though Bangladesh has been very 
active in the UNFCCC processes, and is clearly recognized as a particularly 
vulnerable country, the level of funding remains far less than what is required, and 
moreover, much of it is in the form of loans, rather than grants, and is subject to donor 
interests. What the country needs most is for the UNFCCC to scale up the level of 
adaptation finance to better reflect the needs of developing countries.   
 
Bangladesh’s experience investing in disaster management has shown that 
climate-related investments can achieve results. The country’s investment of more 
than US$10 billion in disaster risk reduction over the past 35 years has helped it 
reduce its losses from natural disasters.170 Effective adaptation, however, requires 
considerably more funding. The government projected that it would cost US$5 billion 
to fund the first five years of the BCCSAP.171 It created the BCCTF and BCCRF in 
part because the UNFCCC financial mechanisms were inadequate. The Adaptation 
Fund, the LDCF and the SCCF all lack the resources needed to fully support 
adaptation, and the GCF remains more promise than substance, likely at least until 
2020.  
 
The case study illustrates that adequate funding is critical to improving climate 
resilience in Bangladesh, and that current levels are inadequate. If Bangladesh is to 
protect itself from the devastating impacts of climate change, and assuming that it is 
somewhat representative of LDCs, UNFCCC parties need to greatly increase the level 
of contributions, access new sources of funding, such as those considered in the AGF 
Report, and ensure that the level of funding committed to adaptation is in the same 
order of magnitude as that committed to mitigation.172  
 
 
c.  Ensure that adaptation funds are used efficiently 
 
 The experience in Bangladesh demonstrates that merely scaling up adaptation 
finance will not ensure successful adaptation on its own. In Bangladesh, where the 
level of corruption is among the worst in the world, there is a significant risk that 
some adaptation funding will not be used effectively. Corruption has already been 
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linked to the selection of projects funded by the BCCTF, and its presence no doubt 
contributed to donor countries’ insistence that the World Bank administer the 
BCCRF.173 Transparency International has noted that climate change adaptation is 
especially susceptible to misuse of funds due to the fact that adaptation projects often 
involve construction, a sector that is highly affected by corruption.174 In Bangladesh, 
projects have been funded with no clear link to climate change, wasting scarce funds 
that could have been put to better use.175  
 
In order to prevent adaptation finance from being wasted, the UNFCCC must 
continue to look for effective ways ensure that strong allocation policies and effective 
monitoring and reviewing procedures are in place, and it needs to increase support for 
capacity building in order to help countries such as Bangladesh implement their own 
policies for ensuring the effective use of funds.  It seems clear from the case study 
that a combination of strong institutions at the UNFCCC and capacity building in 
Bangladesh will be needed to overcome this challenge. 
 
 
d.  Learn from the PPCR 
 
 The PPCR offers the UNFCCC the opportunity to learn from a significant 
initiative at tackling climate change adaptation. The PPCR supports long-term 
programs, rather than the type of projects funded by the UNFCCC, and it encourages 
private sector investment in ways that might also help to increase funding generated 
by the UNFCCC. The PPCR will be able to provide the UNFCCC with valuable 
lessons regarding what works, and what does not work, with respect to climate change 
adaptation. This could help make up for the fact that a large portion of the PPCR’s 
funding comes from developed countries’ Fast Start Finance contributions, monies 
that the UNFCCC would have rather seen channeled to its own more equitable and 
democratic climate funds.176 
 
 
e. Technology transfer and support for indigenous technology development 
 
Given their size and overwhelming dependence on the natural environment for 
basic needs, developing countries like Bangladesh that are more vulnerable to the 
negative consequences of climate change need access to a wide variety of 
technologies in order to effectively adapt. Clearly, technology is a central pillar for 
successful adaptation. However, private companies in industrialized countries hold 
intellectual property rights over various adaptation relevant technologies.  
 
The high cost of accessing these technologies can be prohibitive, and they may 
require further adjustment to be suitable in a developing country context. Since 
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intellectual property rights are a discrete matter regulated by a different legal regime 
(namely, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) which has the potential to facilitate technology transfer), and given 
that private sector firms expect to be compensated for the use of their patents, the 
options under the UNFCCC to enhance technology access for adaptation appear 
somewhat limited. 
 
In light of this, the UNFCCC regime should provide specific financial 
assistance to developing nations to invest in research and development in critical 
areas such as the development of new cultivars, creation of climate resilient 
infrastructure, etc. In other words, the intention should be to promote endogenous 
capacity in the affected countries by helping them develop technologies most 
appropriate to their own circumstances. In addition, unless there are changes to 
intellectual property rights of needed technologies, the UNFCCC will likely have to 
continue to provide specialized funding to purchase licensing rights for technology 
relevant to adaptation, and to facilitate their further development to meet the needs of 
specific countries.  
 
It is clear that states like Bangladesh will have to continue to develop and 
implement adaptation measures and strategies in areas of water management, 
protecting coastal zones, creating new climate resilient infrastructure and 
strengthening existing ones, improving public health, adopting biodiversity 
conservation measures and improving agriculture. In this regard, the technology needs 
assessment is an important step. In short, the areas identified by Bangladesh will have 
to be expanded beyond water and agriculture sectors to include some of the above-
identified areas. This can help demarcate priority technology needs in a broad 
spectrum of relevant areas, which in turn can become the source for a portfolio of 
environmentally sustainable technologies for developing nations, which the UNFCCC 
can work to ensure that these countries have access to. 
 
Since adaptation is necessarily a country-driven activity, the UNFCCC regime 
should facilitate the development of an integrated approach that promotes cooperation 
between the various stakeholders. Such stakeholders include the national and foreign 
governments, the donor community, bilateral and multilateral institutions, non-
governmental organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private sector. 
The ultimate objectives would include carrying out technology needs assessments, the 
creation of mechanisms for technology transfer, creation of enabling environments in 





Despite fiscal and technological constraints and the uncertainty associated 
with climate change impacts, Bangladesh has recognized the urgent need to adapt to 
climate change. The adoption of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and the 
Action Plan stand testimony to its resolve. However, given the inherent limitations 
that Bangladesh and similarly situated poverty-stricken countries face, and the fact 
that these countries have contributed least to the problem of climate change, there is a 
need for a higher scale of support from the UNFCCC regime, if these countries are to 
effectively adapt to climate change impacts.  
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Two aspects emerge as critical. The first is the availability of sufficient funds 
for climate change adaptation that can help nations implement climate change 
adaptation actions, including mainstreaming of these measures into national 
development activities. The second relates to the transfer and development of suitable 
environmentally sound technologies to which developing countries currently do not 
have access, such as the development of new cultivars that are able to withstand 
climate vagaries, technology to implement climate proofing, creation of climate-
resilient infrastructure like polders and sea walls in the coastal regions, ensuring the 
construction of all weather roads to ensure connectivity, etc.  
 
The UNFCCC regime emerges as a platform that needs to reduce the cleft 
between developed and developing countries regarding mitigation and adaptation 
obligations and helps create synergies between the financing of climate change 
adaptation actions and technology transfer to implement adaptation actions. However, 
this cannot be a one-track affair, contingent solely on what the UNFCCC regime can 
offer developing countries. Rather, Bangladesh, with the support of the UNFCCC, 
will have to strengthen its governance mechanisms and institutional frameworks, 
create enabling environments and develop its absorptive capacity in order to ensure 
that the financial and technological benefits derived from the UNFCCC regime reach 
the real beneficiaries at the local level and are not wasted. Ultimately, to succeed, 
adaptation has to be pinned down to local circumstances, involving local inputs, 
planning and implementation.    
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